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Abstract
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and
residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent (or agents) in the other set and
has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no
blocking pairs, i.e., no pair of agents that prefer each other to their assigned matches. Such
a situation is undesirable as it could lead to a deviation in which the blocking pair form
a private arrangement outside the matching. This however assumes that the blocking pair
have social ties or communication channels to facilitate the deviation. Relaxing the stability
definition to take account of the potential lack of social ties between agents can yield larger
stable matchings.
In this paper, we define the Hospitals/Residents problem under Social Stability (HRSS)
which takes into account social ties between agents by introducing a social network graph to
the HR problem. Edges in the social network graph correspond to resident-hospital pairs in
the HR instance that know one another. Pairs that do not have corresponding edges in the
social network graph can belong to a matching M but they can never block M . Relative to
a relaxed stability definition for HRSS, called social stability, we show that socially stable
matchings can have different sizes and the problem of finding a maximum socially stable
matching is NP-hard, though approximable within 3/2. Furthermore we give polynomial
time algorithms for special cases of the problem.
1 Introduction
Matching problems generally involve the assignment of a set (or sets) of agents to one another.
Agents may be required to list other agents they find acceptable in order of preference, either
explicitly or implicitly through a list of desirable characteristics. Agents may also be subject
to capacity constraints, indicating the maximum number of assignments they are allowed to be
involved in.
An example of such a matching problem that has received much attention in literature is the
Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) [11, 13, 28, 24]. An HR instance consists of a set of residents
seeking to be matched to a set of hospitals. Each resident ranks a subset of the hospitals in
strict order of preference, and vice versa. Further, each resident forms an acceptable pair
with every hospital on his preference list. Finally, each hospital has a capacity, indicating the
maximum number of residents that it can be assigned. A matching is a set assignments among
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acceptable pairs such that no resident is assigned to more than one hospital, and no hospital
exceeds its capacity. An acceptable pair forms a blocking pair with respect to a matching, or
blocks a matching, if both agents would rather be assigned to each other than remain with their
assignees (if any) in the matching. A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. HR has
a wide range of applications including traditional markets like the assignment of graduating
medical students (residents) to hospitals [18, 27] and students to high schools [1, 2], and online
markets like oDesk (an online labour market), AirBnB (an online short-term housing rental
market), and Match.com/OkCupid/etc. (online dating markets). In applications such as these,
it has been convincingly argued that stability is a desirable property of a matching [27].
Although the concept of stability is important in many applications of matching problems,
there are classes of matching problems (such as the Stable Roommates problem) for which an
instance is not guaranteed to admit a stable matching [11]. Moreover, enforcing the stability
requirement tends to reduce the size of matchings discovered [6]. This is an issue particularly
in the case of applications where it is desirable to find the largest possible matching. Also, it
is generally assumed that a resident-hospital pair that blocks a matching in theory will also
block the matching in practice. However this assumption is not always true in some real-life
applications, as resident-hospital pairs are more likely to form blocking pairs in practice if social
ties exist between them. These factors have motivated studies into alternative, weaker stability
definitions that still aim to prevent a given matching from being subverted in practice while
increasing the number of agents involved in the matchings.
Arcaute and Vassilvitskii [3] described the Hospitals/Residents problem in the context of
assigning job applicants to company positions. They observed that applicants are more likely
to be employed by a company if they are recommended by their friends who are already employ-
ees of that company. In their model, an applicant-company pair (a, c) may block a matching
M if (a, c) blocks it in the traditional sense (as described in the analogous HR context) and
a is friends with another applicant a′ assigned to c in M . Thus their problem incorporates
both the traditional HR problem and additionally an underlying social network, represented
as an undirected graph consisting of applicants as nodes and edges between nodes where the
corresponding applicants have some social ties (e.g., are friends). Matchings that admit no
blocking pair in this context are called locally stable due to the addition of the informational
constraint on blocking pairs. Cheng and McDermid [8] investigated the problem (which they
called HR+SN) further and established various algorithmic properties and complexity results.
They showed that locally stable matchings can be of different sizes and the problem of finding
a maximum locally stable matching is NP-hard. They identified special cases where the prob-
lem is polynomially solvable and gave upper and lower bounds on the approximability of the
problem.
While the HR+SN model is quite natural in the job market, it makes an assumption that
the employed applicant a′ will always be willing to make a recommendation. This however may
not be the case as a recommendation may in practice lead to a′ being rejected by his assigned
company. Ultimately this may lead to a reassignment for a′ to a worse company or indeed
a′ may end up unmatched. While it is true that a scenario may arise where these social ties
between applicants may lead to a blocking pair of a matching, it is arguably equally likely that
social ties between an applicant and the company itself will exist. That is, an applicant need
not know another applicant who was employed by the company in order to block a matching;
it is enough for him to know any employee in the company (for example the Head of Human
Resources). Such a model could also be natural in many applications both within and beyond
the job market context.
Additionally, many matching markets are cleared by a centralised clearinghouse. While
more traditional markets require agents to explicitly list potential matches, many online mar-
kets ask agents to list desirable characteristics and then use software to infer the preference lists
of the agents. In these markets, communication between agents is facilitated by the centralised
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clearinghouse. Some agent pairs in the market may have social ties outside the clearinghouse.
Often these social ties are due to past interactions within the marketplace and so the clear-
inghouse is aware of them. These pairs can communicate outside the clearinghouse and might
block proposed matchings. Most pairs, however, only become aware of each other when the
clearinghouse proposes them as a match. Thus even if they prefer each other to their assigned
matches, they will not be able to discover each other and deviate from the matching.
Based on these ideas, we present a variant of HR called the Hospitals / Residents problem
under Social Stability (HRSS). In this model, which we describe in the context of assigning
graduating medical residents to hospital positions, we assume that a resident-hospital pair will
only form a blocking pair in practice if there exists some social relationship between them. Two
agents that have such a social relationship are called an acquainted pair, and this is represented
by an edge in a social network graph. We call a pair of agents that do not have such a social
relationship an unacquainted pair. Such a pair may be part of a matching M (given that M
is typically constructed by a trusted third party, i.e., a centralised clearinghouse) but cannot
form a blocking pair with respect to M . As a consequence, although a resident-hospital pair
may form a blocking pair in the classical sense, if they are an unacquainted pair, they will not
form a blocking pair in the HRSS context. A matching that admits no blocking pair in this
new context is said to be socially stable. We denote the one-to-one restriction of HRSS as the
Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists under Social Stability (SMISS).
Hoefer and Wagner [15, 16] studied a problem that generalises both HR+SN and HRSS.
In their model, the social network graph involves all agents and need not be bipartite. A pair
locally blocks a given matching M if (i) it blocks in the classical sense, and (ii) the agents
involved are at most l edges apart in the social network graph augmented by M . This scenario
can be viewed as a generalisation of the HR+SN (l = 2) and HRSS (l = 1) models. They studied
the convergence time for better-response dynamics that converge to locally stable matchings,
and also established a lower bound for the approximabiliy of the problem of finding a maximum
locally stable matching (for the case that l ≤ 2).
Locally stable matchings have also been investigated in the context of the Stable Room-
mates problem (a non-bipartite generalisation of the Stable Marriage problem) in [7]. Here,
the Stable Roommates problem with Free edges (SRF) as introduced was motivated by the ob-
servation that, in kidney exchange matching schemes, donors and recipients do not always have
full information about others and are more likely to have information only on others in the
same transplant centre as them. The problem is defined by the traditional Stable Roommates
problem together with a set of free edges. These correspond to pairs of agents in different trans-
plant centres that do not share preference information; such pairs may be involved in stable
matchings, but cannot block any matching. It is shown in [7] that the problem of determining
whether a stable matching exists, given an SRF instance, is NP-complete.
In this paper, we present some algorithmic results for the HRSS model described above.
In Section 2, we present some preliminary definitions and observations. We give a reduction
from the HRSS to the HR+SN problem in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that MAX HRSS,
the problem of finding a maximum socially stable matching given an HRSS instance I, is NP-
hard even under certain restrictions on the lengths of the preference lists. This result holds
even if I is an instance of SMISS. Then in Section 5, we consider the approximability of MAX
HRSS. We give a 3/2-approximation algorithm for the problem, and also show that it is not
approximable within 21/19 − ε, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, and not approximable within
3/2 − ε, for any ε > 0, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture. in Section 6 we present
polynomial-time algorithms for three special cases of MAX HRSS, including the cases where
(i) each resident’s list is of length at most 2 and each hospital has capacity 1, (ii) the number
of unacquainted pairs is constant, and (iii) the number of acquainted pairs is constant. Finally
some open problems are given in Section 7.
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men’s preferences women’s preferences
m1 : w1 w1 : m2 m1
m2 : w1 w2 w2 : m2
social network graph G
m2 w2
m1 w1
Figure 1: SMISS instance (I,G)
2 Preliminary definitions and results
An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR), as defined in [11], contains a set
R = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} of residents, a set H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} of hospitals. Each resident ri ∈ R
ranks a subset of H in strict order of preference; each hospital hj ∈ H ranks a subset of R,
consisting of those residents who ranked hj , in strict order of preference. Each hospital hj also
has a capacity cj ∈ Z+ indicating the maximum number of residents that can be assigned to it.
A pair (ri, hj) is called an acceptable pair if hj appears in ri’s preference list. We denote by A
the set of all acceptable pairs. A matching M is a set of acceptable pairs such that each resident
is assigned to at most one hospital and the number of residents assigned to each hospital does
not exceed its capacity. If ri is matched in M , we denote the hospital assigned to resident ri
in M by M(ri). We denote the set of residents assigned to hospital hj in M as M(hj). A
resident ri is unmatched in M if no pair in M contains ri. A hospital hj is undersubscribed in
M if |M(hj)| < cj . A pair (ri, hj) is said to block a matching M , or form a blocking pair with
respect to M , in the classical sense, if (i) ri is unmatched in M or prefers hj to M(ri) and (ii)
hj is undersubscribed in M or prefers ri to some resident in M(hj). A matching that admits
no blocking pair is said to be stable.
We define an instance (I,G) of the Hospitals/Residents Problem under Social Stability
(HRSS) as consisting of an HR instance I (as defined above) and a bipartite graph G =
(R ∪ H,A), where A ⊆ A. A pair (ri, hj) belongs to A if and only if ri has social ties with
hj . We call (ri, hj) an acquainted pair. We also define the set of unacquainted pairs (which
cannot block any matching) to be U = A\A. A pair (ri, hj) socially blocks a matching M , or
forms a social blocking pair with respect to M , if (ri, hj) blocks M in the classical sense in the
underlying HR instance I and (ri, hj) ∈ A. A matching M is said to be socially stable if there
exists no social blocking pair with respect to M . If we restrict the hospitals’ capacities to 1, we
obtain the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists under Social Stability (SMISS), and
refer to the agents as men U = {m1, . . . ,mn1} and women W = {w1, . . . , wn2}.
Clearly every instance of HRSS admits a socially stable matching. This is because the
underlying HR instance is bound to admit a stable matching [11] which is also socially stable.
However socially stable matchings could be larger than stable matchings. Consider the SMISS
instance (I,G) shown in Figure 1. Matchings M1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} and M2 = {(m2, w1)}
are both socially stable in (I,G) and M2 is the unique stable matching. Thus an instance of
SMISS (and hence HRSS) can admit a socially stable matching that is twice the size of a stable
matching. Clearly the instance shown in Figure 1 can be replicated to give an arbitrarily large
SMISS instance with a socially stable matching that is twice the size of a stable matching.
This, and applications where we seek to match as many agents as possible, motivates MAX
HRSS.
3 Reduction from HRSS to HR+SN
As defined in [3, 8], an instance (I,G′) of the HR+SN problem involves a Hospitals / Res-
idents instance I, defined in [11], containing a set R = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} of residents, a set
H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} of hospitals, and a graph G describing the social network (SN) of the
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residents. In the graph G′ = (V,E), V = R and an edge {ri, rk} belongs to E if and only if
ri and rk have social ties. A pair (ri, hj) is a local blocking pair with respect to a matching
M , or locally blocks M , if (ri, hj) blocks M in the classical sense and there is some resident
rk such that {ri, rk} ∈ E and rk ∈ M(hj). A matching M is said to be locally stable if there
exists no local blocking pair with respect to M . In the HR+SN (respectively HRSS) context
we refer to a resident-complete locally (respectively socially) stable matching as one in which
all the residents are matched.
In this section we show the close relationship between the HRSS and HR+SN problems.
Consider an instance (I,G) of HRSS where I is the underlying HR instance and G is the social
network graph. I involves of a set of residents R0 = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} and a set of hospitals
H0 = {h1, h2, ..., hn2}. We construct an instance (I ′, G′) of HR+SN from (I,G) as follows: let
I ′ consist of a set of residents R = R0∪R1 where R1 = {rn1+1, rn1+2, ..., rn1+n2}. Every resident
rn1+j ∈ R1 has a single entry hj in his preference list. Every resident ri ∈ R0 has an identical
preference list in I ′ as in I. Let I ′ also involve a set of hospitals H, where H = H0 such that
every hospital hj ∈ H has resident rn1+j as the first entry in its preference list and has capacity
c′j = cj +1. hj ’s preference list in I is then appended to rni+j to yield hj ’s preference list in I
′.
To construct G′, let the vertices in G′ correspond to the residents in R and add edge {ri, rn1+j}
to G′ if and only if (ri, hj) ∈ A, where A = E(G) is the set of acquainted pairs in (I,G).
Theorem 3.1 IfM is a socially stable matching in (I,G), thenM ′ =M∪{(rn1+j , hj) : rn1+j ∈
R1} is a locally stable matching in (I ′, G′). Conversely ifM ′ is a resident-complete locally stable
matching in (I ′, G′) then M = M ′\{(rn1+j, hj) : rn1+j ∈ R1} is a resident-complete socially
stable matching in (I,G).
Proof SupposeM is socially stable in (I,G). Then no (classical) blocking pair with respect to
M in I is contained in G. Let M ′ =M ∪ {(rn1+j, hj) : rn1+j ∈ R1}. If some pair (r, h) locally
blocks M ′ in (I ′, G′) then (i) (r, h) must be a blocking pair with respect to M ′ in I ′, and (ii)
{r, r′} ∈ E for some r′ ∈ M ′(h). By construction, for every edge in E, one resident is in R0
and the other in R1. If r ∈ R1 then r cannot form any blocking pair with respect to M ′ as he
is matched to his only choice. If r ∈ R0 then r′ = rn1+j ∈ R1 for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2), and
h =M ′(rn1+j) = hj. Thus (r, h) ∈ A. By the construction of the preference lists in (I ′, G′), as
(r, h) is a (classical) blocking pair of M ′ in I ′, (r, h) is also a (classical) blocking pair of M in
I. Hence (r, h) socially blocks M in (I,G), a contradiction.
Conversely supposeM ′ is a resident-complete locally stable matching in (I ′, G′). Then there
is no blocking pair (r, h) of M ′ in I ′ such that {r, r′} ∈ E for some r′ ∈ R where r′ ∈ M ′(h).
Let M = M ′\{(rn1+j, hj) : rn1+j ∈ R1}. Clearly M is a resident-complete matching in I. If
some pair (r, h) socially blocksM in (I,G), (i) (r, h) must blockM in I (and thusM ′ in I ′) and
(ii) (r, h) ∈ A. By construction, if (r, h) ∈ A, then {r, r′} ∈ E where r ∈ R0, r′ = rn1+j ∈ R1
and h = hj . But as M
′ is resident-complete, (rn1+j, hj) ∈ M ′ for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2). Thus
r′ = rn1+j ∈ M ′(h), a contradiction to the initial assumption that M ′ is locally stable in
(I ′, G′). 
Although the converse statement in Theorem 3.1 places a severe restriction on M ′ (it must
be a resident-complete locally stable matching in the HR+SN instance (I ′, G′)), it can be
relaxed slightly to the case that M ′ is any locally stable matching in which all the residents
rn1+j ∈ R1 are matched. It remains to be shown that a reduction exists from HRSS to HR+SN
that does not place such a restriction on M ′.
4 Hardness of HRSS
We now show that MAX SMISS, the problem of finding a maximum socially stable matching
given an SMISS instance is NP-hard. Indeed we prove NP-completeness for COM SMISS, the
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problem of deciding whether there exists a complete socially stable matching (i.e., a socially
stable matching in which all men and women are matched) in an instance of SMISS. It is
obvious that, given a matching M of size k, it can be verified in polynomial time whether M
is socially stable, thus the problem is in NP. Next we define the Stable Marriage problem with
Ties and Incomplete Lists (SMTI) as a variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem [11]
where men and women are allowed to find each other unacceptable (thus causing incomplete
preference lists) and preference lists may include ties, representing indifference. For example
two women may be tied in a given man’s preference list. It was shown in [25] that COM SMTI,
the problem of deciding whether a complete stable matching exists in an instance of SMTI,
is NP-complete even if the ties occur in the men’s lists only and each tie occurs at the tail
of some list. An SMTI instance I satisfying these restrictions can be reduced to an SMISS
instance (I ′, G) in polynomial time such that a matching M is a complete stable matching in
I if and only if M is a complete socially stable matching in (I ′, G). These observations lead to
the following result.
Theorem 4.1 COM SMISS is NP-complete.
Proof Consider an instance I of SMTI where the ties occur only on the mens’ preference
lists and each man has one tie which occurs at the end of the list (a tie may be of length
1 for this purpose). We define t(mi) as the set of women contained in the tie in man mi’s
preference list. We can construct an instance (I ′, G) of SMISS such that I ′ is the Stable
Marriage instance with incomplete lists formed by breaking the ties in I in an arbitrary manner.
Let G = (U ∪W, A), where U and W are the sets of all men and women in I respectively and
A =
⋃
mi∈U
⋃
wj /∈t(mi)
(mi, wj). We claim that a matching M is a complete stable matching in
I if and only if M is a complete socially stable matching in (I ′, G).
Suppose M is a complete stable matching in I. Suppose also that M is not socially stable
in (I ′, G). Then there exists some pair (mi, wj) ∈ A that socially blocks M in (I ′, G). Since
(mi, wj) ∈ A, wj /∈ t(mi). Thus mi prefers wj to M(mi) in I. Also wj prefers mi to M(wj)
since there are no ties in wj ’s preference list. Thus (mi, wj) blocks M in I, a contradiction to
our initial assumption.
Conversely, suppose M is a complete socially stable matching in (I ′, G). Suppose also that
M is not stable in I. Then there exists some pair (mi, wj) that blocksM in I. IfM(mi) ∈ t(mi)
then wj /∈ t(mi) so mi prefers wj to M(mi) in (I ′, G). If M(mi) /∈ t(mi) then mi prefers wj to
M(mi) in (I
′, G). wj has the same preference list in I and (I
′, G). So (mi, wj) ∈ A and thus
the pair socially blocks M in (I ′, G), a contradiction to our initial assumption. 
As discussed in [20], some centralised matching schemes usually require the agents in one
or more sets to have preference lists bounded in length by some small integer. For example,
until recently, in the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (the centralised clearinghouse for
matching medical residents in Scotland) [18], medical graduates were required to rank only 6
hospitals in their preference lists. We denote by (p, q)-MAX HRSS the problem of finding a
maximum socially stable matching in an HRSS instance where each resident is allowed to rank
at most p hospitals and each hospital at most q residents. We set p =∞ and q =∞ to represent
instances where the residents and hospitals respectively are allowed to have unbounded-length
preference lists. Analogously we may obtain the definition of (p, q)-MAX SMISS and (p, q)-
COM SMISS from MAX SMISS and COM SMISS respectively. It turns out that (p, q)-COM
SMISS is NP-complete even for small values of p and q.
Theorem 4.2 (3,3)-COM SMISS is NP-complete.
Proof We prove this by inspecting the hardness result described for the (3, 3)-COM SMTI
problem by Irving et al. [20]. They showed that (3, 3)-COM SMTI, the problem of deciding
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whether a complete stable matching exists in an instance of SMTI where each preference list
is of length at most 3, is NP-complete using a reduction from a variant of the SAT problem.
By inspecting the instance I of SMTI, constructed in the proof, we observe that all the
ties appear on the women’s side of the instance and appear at the ends of the preference list.
We have shown in Theorem 4.1 that an instance I of SMTI in this form can be reduced in
polynomial time to an instance (I ′, G) of SMISS such that a matching M is a complete stable
matching in I if and only if M is a complete socially stable matching in (I ′, G). We conclude
that (3, 3)-COM SMISS is also NP-complete. 
5 Approximating MAX HRSS
As shown in Section 4, MAX HRSS is NP-hard. In order to deal with this hardness, polynomial-
time approximation algorithms can be developed for MAX HRSS. In this section we present
a 3/2-approximation algorithm for MAX HRSS. We show this is tight assuming the Unique
Games Conjecture (UCG), and also show a 21/19 − ε lower bound assuming P 6= NP . The
lower bounds hold even for MAX SMISS.
5.1 Approximation
For the upper bound for MAX HRSS, we observe that a technique known as cloning has been
described in literature [13, 28], which may be used to convert an HR instance I into an instance
I ′ of the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists in polynomial time, such that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the set of stable matchings in I and I ′. A similar technique
can be used to convert an HRSS instance to an SMISS instance in polynomial time.
Let (I,G) be an instance of HRSS where R = {r1, r2, ..., rn1} is the set of residents and
H = {h1, h2, ..., hn2} is the set of hospitals. Let cj be the capacity of hospital hj ∈ H. We can
construct an instance (I ′, G′) of SMISS as follows. Each resident in (I,G) corresponds to a man
in (I ′, G′). Each hospital hj ∈ H gives rise to cj women in (I ′, G′) denoted by hj,1, hj,2, ..., hj,cj
each of whom has the same preference list as hj in (I
′, G′) but with a capacity of 1. Each man
ri ∈ R starts off with the same preference list in (I ′, G′) as he has in (I,G). We then replace
each entry on his list by the cj women hj,1, hj,2, ..., hj,cj listed in strict order (increasing on
second subscript). G′ has vertex set R∪H ′, where H ′ = {hj,k : hj ∈ H ∧1 ≤ k ≤ cj}, and edge
set A′ = {(ri, hj,k) : (ri, hj) ∈ A ∧ 1 ≤ k ≤ cj}, with A = E(G) denoting the set of acquainted
pairs in (I,G).
Theorem 5.1 Given an instance (I,G) of HRSS, we may construct in O(n1+cmaxm) time an
instance (I ′, G′) of SMISS such that a socially stable matching M in (I,G) can be transformed
in O(cmaxm) time to a socially stable matching M
′ in (I ′, G′) with |M ′| = |M | and conversely,
where n1 is the number of residents, cmax is the maximum hospital capacity and m is the
number of acceptable resident-hospital pairs in I.
Proof Let (I,G) be an instance of HRSS and (I ′, G′) be an instance of SMISS cloned from
(I,G). Let M be a socially stable matching in (I,G). We form a matching M ′ in (I ′, G′) as
follows. For each hj ∈ H, let rj,1, rj,2, ...rj,xj be the set of residents assigned to hj in M where
xj ≤ cj , and k < l implies that hj prefers rj,k to rj,l. Add (rj,k, hkj ) toM ′ (1 ≤ k ≤ xj). Clearly
M ′ is a matching in (I ′, G′) such that |M ′| = |M |, and it is straightforward to verify that M ′
is socially stable in (I ′, G′).
Conversely letM ′ be a socially stable matching in (I ′, G′). We form a matchingM in (I,G)
as follows. For each (ri, h
k
j ) ∈ M ′, add (ri, hj) to M . Clearly M is a socially stable matching
in (I,G) such that |M | = |M ′|.
The complexities stated arise from the fact that I ′ has O(n1 + C) agents and O(cmaxm)
acceptable man-woman pairs, where C is the total capacity of the hospitals in I. 
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Due to Theorem 5.1, an approximation algorithm α for MAX SMISS with performance
guarantee c (for some constant c > 0) can be used to obtain an approximation for MAX HRSS
with the same performance guarantee. This can be done by cloning the HRSS instance (I,G)
to form an SMISS instance (I ′, G′) using the technique outlined above, applying α to (I ′, G′)
to obtain a matching M ′. This matching can then be transformed to a matching M in (I,G)
such that |M | = |M ′| (again as in the proof of Theorem 5.1). Our first upper bound for MAX
HRSS is an immediate consequence of the fact that any stable matching is at least half the size
of a maximum socially stable matching.
Proposition 5.2 MAX HRSS is approximable within a factor of 2.
Proof Let M be a maximum socially stable matching given an instance (I,G) of SMISS and
let M ′ be a stable matching in I. Thus M ′ is a maximal matching in the underlying bipartite
graph G′ in I. Hence |M ′| ≥ β+(G′)/2 where β+(G′) is the size of a maximum matching in G′
[23]. Also β+(G′) ≥ |M | and so |M ′| ≥ |M |/2. 
We now present a 3/2-approximation algorithm for MAX SMISS. The algorithm relies
on the principles outlined in the 3/2-approximation algorithms for the general case of MAX
HRT, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching given an instance of
the Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties, as presented by Kira´ly [22] and McDermid [26].
Given an instance (I,G) of SMISS, the algorithm works by running a modified version of the
extended Gale-Shapley algorithm [11] where unmatched men are given a chance to propose
again by promoting them on all the preference lists on which they appear. Let A and U denote
the sets of acquainted and unacquainted pairs in (I,G) respectively.
Consider a woman wj in (I,G). We denote an unacquainted man mi on wj’s preference list
as one where (mi, wj) ∈ U . Similarly we denote an acquainted man mi on wj’s preference list
as one where (mi, wj) ∈ A. For a man mi, we denote next(mi) as the next woman on mi’s list
succeeding the last woman to whom he proposed to or the first woman on mi’s list if he has
been newly promoted or is proposing for the first time. During the execution of the algorithm
if a man runs out of women to propose to on his list for the first time, he is promoted, thus
allowing him to propose to the remaining women on his list beginning from the first. A man
can only be promoted once during the execution of the algorithm. If a promoted man still
remains unmatched after proposing to all the women on his preference list, he is removed from
the instance and will not be part of the final matching.
In the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm [11] a woman wj prefers a man mi to another mk
if rank(wj,mi) < rank(wj,mk). We define a modified version of the extended Gale-Shapley
algorithm [13], mod-EXGS, where a woman does not accept or reject proposals from men solely
on the basis of their positions on her preference list, but also on the basis of their status as
to whether they are acquainted or unacquainted men on her list and whether they have been
promoted. Given two men mi and mk on a woman wj ’s preference list, we define the relations
⊳wj , ⊳
′
wj and ≺wj in Definition 5.3
Definition 5.3 Let mi and mk be any two men on a woman wj’s list. Then
1. mi ⊳wj mk if either
(i) (mi, wj) ∈ U , (mk, wj) ∈ U , mi is promoted and mk is unpromoted or
(ii) (mi, wj) ∈ A, (mk, wj) ∈ U and mk is unpromoted.
2. mi ⊳
′
wj mk if mi /⊳wj mk , mk /⊳wj mi and wj prefers mi to mk in the classical sense.
We define ≺wj= ⊳wj ∪ ⊳′wj .
The relation ≺wj will be used to determine whether a proposal from a man is accepted or
rejected by wj .
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Algorithm 1 approx-SMISS
1: initial matching M = ∅;
2: while some unmatched man with a non-empty preference list exists do
3: call mod-EXGS;
4: for all mi such that mi is unmatched and promoted do
5: remove mi from instance;
6: end for
7: for all mi such that mi is unmatched, unpromoted and has a non-empty preference list do
8: promote mi;
9: end for
10: end while
11: return the resulting matching M ;
Algorithm 2 mod-EXGS
1: while some man mi is unmatched and still has a woman left on his list do
2: wj = next(mi);
3: if wj is matched in M and mi ≺wj M(wj) then
4: M = M \ {(M(wj), wj)};
5: end if
6: if wj is unmatched in M then
7: M = M ∪ {(mi, wj)};
8: end if
9: if (mi, wj) ∈ A then
10: for each mk such that (mk, wj) ∈ A and rank(wj ,mk) > rank(wj ,mi) do
11: delete (mk, wj) from instance;
12: end for
13: end if
14: end while
The main algorithm approx-SMISS (as shown in Algorithm 1) starts by calling mod-EXGS
(as shown in Algorithm 2) where a proposal sequence is started by allowing each man to propose
to women beginning from the first woman on his preference list. If a man mi proposes to a
woman wj on his list and wj is matched and mi ≺wj M(wj), then wj is unmatched from her
partner mk and mk will be allowed to continue proposing to other women on his list. wj is
then assigned to mi. On the other hand, if M(wj) ≺wj mi then wj rejects mi’s proposal.
Also if wj is unmatched when mi proposes, she is assigned to mi. Irrespective of whether the
proposal from mi is accepted or rejected, if (mi, wj) ∈ A then all pairs (mk, wj) such that
rank(wj,mk) > rank(wj,mi) are deleted from the instance. However if (mi, wj) ∈ U no such
deletions take place. This proposal sequence continues until every man is either matched or
has exhausted his preference list.
After each proposal sequence (where control is returned to the approx-SMISS algorithm), if
a promoted man still remains unmatched after proposing to all the women on his preference list,
he is removed from the instance. Also if a previously unpromoted man exhausts his preference
lists and is still unmatched, he is promoted and a new proposal sequence initiated (by calling
mod-EXGS ). The algorithm terminates when each man either (i) is assigned a partner, (ii) has
no woman on his preference list or (iii) has been promoted and has proposed to all the women
on his preference list for a second time.
Lemma 5.4 If Algorithm 1 is executed on an SMISS instance (I,G), it terminates with a
socially stable matching M in (I,G).
Proof Suppose M is not a socially stable matching and some pair (mi, wj) socially blocks M
in (I,G). Hence (mi, wj) ∈ A. If wj is unmatched in M then she never received a proposal
from mi (as if she did, she will never become unmatched afterwards). This implies that mi
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must prefer his partner in M to wj as he never proposed to wj . Thus (mi, wj) cannot socially
block M in this case.
On the other hand, suppose wj is matched in M but prefers mi to M(wj) = mk. Also
suppose mi is either unmatched in M or prefers wj to M(mi). Then mi proposed to wj during
the algorithm’s execution or (mi, wj) was deleted. In either case, all successors of mi on wj ’s
list will be deleted, so (mk, wj) /∈M , a contradiction 
Lemma 5.5 During any execution of the algorithm mod-EXGS, if mi proposes to wj and
(mi, wj) ∈ A then wj will never reject mi if rank(wj,mi) < rank(wj,M(wj)).
Proof This follows from our definition of the ≺wj relation. Suppose that wj rejects mi for
a some man mk and rank(wj,mi) < rank(wj,mk). Thus mk ≺wj mi. This implies that
mk ⊳w mi or mk ⊳
′
w mi. Since (mi, wj) ∈ A then mk /⊳w mi so mk ⊳′w mi which in turn
implies that rank(wj ,mk) < rank(wj,mi), a contradiction to our assumption. 
The execution of the mod-EXGS algorithm takes O(m) time where m = |A| is the number
of acceptable pairs. These executions can be performed at most 2n1 times, where n1 is the
number of men, as a man is given at most two chances to propose to the women on his list.
Thus the overall time complexity of the algorithm is O(n1m). The above results, together with
Theorem 5.1, lead us to state the following theorem concerning the performance guarantee of
the approximation algorithm for MAX HRSS.
Theorem 5.6 MAX HRSS is approximable within a factor of 3/2.
Proof We prove this result by adopting techniques similar to those used by Iwama et al. [21]
and subsequently by Kira´ly [22]. We consider alternating paths of odd-length in connected
components of the union M ∪ Mopt. It is easy to see that, for alternating paths of length
greater than 3, the number of edges in Mopt is at most 3/2 times the number of edges in M .
We now show that alternating paths of length 3 cannot exist in M ∪Mopt.
Consider an alternating path of length 3 〈(m,w′), (m,w), (m′, w)〉 such that (m,w′) ∈Mopt,
(m,w) ∈M and (m′, w) ∈Mopt. Since w′ is unmatched inM , she was never proposed to during
the entire execution of the algorithm. So w′ did not delete any men from her preference list and
m is unpromoted (if he had been promoted, he would have proposed to w′). Thus m prefers
w to w′. Also since m′ is unmatched in M , either (i) the pair (m′, w) was deleted from the
instance at some point during the execution of the algorithm or (ii) w rejected m′ twice during
the execution of the algorithm.
Consider case (i): if (m′, w) was deleted during the execution of the algorithm then w
received a proposal from some man m′′ such that (m′′, w) ∈ A and w prefers m′′ to m′. Thus
all successors of m′′ on w’s list would also have been deleted and so w prefers m to m′′ and
hence to m′. Although w would have accepted the proposal from m′′ temporarily (see Lemma
5.5), she ended up with an unpromoted man m. It might be that m = m′′. On the other hand,
suppose she accepted a series of proposals from men after m′′ proposed to w 〈m′′0 ,m′′1 , ...,m′′k〉 for
some k ≥ 0 before finally being assigned to m. Thus m′′0 ≺w m′′, which implies that m′′0 ⊳w m′′
or m′′0 ⊳
′
w m
′′. Since (m′′, w) ∈ A, m′′0 /⊳w m′′ which means m′′0 ⊳′w m′′. But for that to be
true, m′′ /⊳w m
′′
0 as well. For that to happen, m
′′
0 must not be an unacquainted unpromoted
man on w’s list. This means m′′0 can be an acquainted man or an unacquainted promoted man
on w’s list. If m = m′′0 (i.e. k = 0) then we know that m is unpromoted and so (m,w) ∈ A.
On the other hand if another man m′′1 exists in the sequence, then the same argument follows
that m′′1 ≺w m′′0 means that m′′1 ⊳w m′′0 or m′′1 ⊳′w m′′0. As already observed, m′′0 is either an
acquainted man or an unacquainted, promoted man on w’s list. In both cases, m′′1 /⊳w m
′′
0
meaning m′′1 ⊳
′
w m
′′
0. This implies that m
′′
0 /⊳w m
′′
1 . But for that condition to be satisfied, m
′′
1
must not be an unacquainted unpromoted man on w’s list. Once again this means m′′1 can
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m1 : w1 w3 w1 : m2 m1
m2 : w1 w2 w2 : m2 m3
m3 : w2 w3 : m1
social network graph G
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Figure 2: |Mopt| = (3/2).|M |
be an acquainted man or an unacquainted promoted man on w’s list. The same sequence can
continue for all men in the sequence until m proposes. Since we already established that m is
unpromoted, it follows that (m,w) ∈ A.
Now consider case (ii): w rejected m′ even when he was promoted because of a proposal
from some man m′′. Thus m′′ ≺w m′ means m′′ ⊳w m′ or m′′ ⊳′w m′. Since we know that
m′ was promoted, then m′′ /⊳w m
′ thus m′′ ⊳′w m
′. This means that m′ /⊳w m
′′ and w prefers
m′′ to m′. Since m′ /⊳w m
′′ , m′′ must not be an unacquainted unpromoted man on w’s list as
m′ is promoted. Thus m′′ must be promoted or an acquainted man on w’s list. If m′′ were an
acquainted man on w’s list, the pair (m′, w) would be deleted and the logic presented in case
(i) above would follow through. Now suppose m′′ is promoted and unacquainted on w’s list.
We know that m 6= m′′ as m was unpromoted in M . Then w may have accepted a series of
proposals from men 〈m′′0,m′′1 , ...,m′′k〉 for some k ≥ 0 before finally being assigned to m. Thus
m′′0 ≺w m′′ means m′′0 ⊳w m′′ or m′′0 ⊳′w m′′. Since m′′ is promoted and unacquainted on w’s
list m′′0 /⊳w m
′′ meaning m′′0 ⊳
′
w m
′′. This implies that m′′ /⊳w m
′′
0. But for that condition to be
satisfied, m′′0 must not be an unacquainted unpromoted man on w’s list. A similar argument
to the one presented for case (i) above results in the conclusion that (m,w) ∈ A.
The following conditions (i) m prefers w to w′ (ii) w prefers m to m′ and (iii) (m,w) ∈ A
imply that (m,w) will socially block Mopt, a contradiction. 
The SIMSS instance shown in Figure 2 shows that the 3/2 bound for the algorithm is tight.
Here Mopt = {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)} is the unique maximum socially stable matching.
Also the approximation algorithm outputs M = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} irrespective of the order
in which proposals are made. Clearly this instance can be replicated to obtain an arbitrarily
large SMISS instance for which the performance guarantee is tight.
We remark that a similar 3/2-approximation algorithm for MAX HRSS was presented
independently by Askalidis et al. in [4].
5.2 Inapproximability
We now show lower bounds on the approximability of our problem. We start by giving the
inapproximability result assuming P 6=NP.
Theorem 5.7 MAX SMISS is not approximable within 21/19−ε for any ε > 0, unless P=NP.
Proof We rely on a proof of the NP-hardness of approximating MAX SMTI given in [14]. It is
shown that there is no approximation algorithm for MAX SMTI with performance guarantee
of 21/19 − ε for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. This is shown to be true even for instances where
ties appear on one side only, each preference list is either strictly ordered or has a single tie
of length 2 and ties appear at the end of the preference lists. Thus the same reduction shown
in the proof of Theorem 4.1 can be used to construct an SMISS instance (I,G) such that a
polynomial-time algorithm that approximates MAX SMISS to within a factor of 21/19 − ε
would do the same for MAX SMTI. 
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Figure 3: Reduction from IND SET: The gadget of some edge (vi, vj)
We can get a better lower bound of 3/2− ε, for any ε > 0, if we strengthen our assumption
from P 6= NP to the truth of the UCG. We do that by showing a reduction from the NP-hard
problem of Independent Set (IND SET) and then using an inapproximability result for it from
[5] . Along with the hardness of approximation, the reduction gives us a second proof of the
NP-hardness of MAX HRSS
An instance of IND SET consists of a pair (G, k) of a graph and an integer k ≥ 0 and asks if
the graph G contains a set S ⊆ V (G) such that |S| = k and for every v1, v2 ∈ S, (v1, v2) /∈ E(G),
i.e. no two nodes of S are connected with an edge. It is well-known that this problem is NP-
hard.
Our reduction follows very closely the reduction by Hoefer and Wagner [16] from IND SET
to the problem of calculating the maximum locally stable matching. Although the basic idea of
the construction is the same, we need to adjust the details as well as the proofs to our problem.
Given a graph G = (V,E) we create an instance (I,G′ = (U ∪ W, A)) of the SMISS
matching problem as follows: First we enumerate (arbitrarily but consistently) all the nodes
of G : v1, v2, . . . , vn, where n = |V (G)|. For every vi ∈ V (G) we create four vertices of G′:
mvi
1
,mvi
2
∈ U and wvi
1
, wvi
2
∈ W. For every vi ∈ V (G) we denote by NG(vi) = {vj | (vi, vj) ∈
E(G)} the neighborhood of vi in G, i.e. the nodes that vi is connected with in G.
For every vi ∈ V (G) and every vj ∈ NG(vi) we add the edge {mvi
1
, w
vj
2
} to A(G′). See
Figure 2 for an example of the transformation for an edge (vi, vj). The preferences of the
agents are as follows (listed in order of preference with most prefered match first):
Man mvi
1
: wvi
2
, {w
vj
2
in increasing order on j | vj ∈ NG(vi)}, wvi
1
Man mvi
2
: wvi
2
Woman wvi
1
: mvi
1
Woman wvi
2
: mvi
1
, {m
vj
1
in increasing order on j | vj ∈ NG(vi)},mvi
2
Notice that the enumeration of the vertices of V (G) that we did in the beginning of our
reduction shows up here, in the preferences of mvi
1
and wvi
2
.
The idea behind our construction is as follows. Each man is either of type 1 (mvi
1
) or of type
2 (mvi
2
), and similarly each woman is of type 1 or type 2. Type 1 women and type 2 men are both
quite picky: wvi
1
’s only acceptable partner is mvi
1
and similarly mvi
2
’s only acceptable partner is
wvi
2
, large matchings ought to include (mvi
1
, wvi
1
) and (mvi
2
, wvi
2
). However, the other partners in
these pairs, mvi
1
and wvi
2
, like this situation least among all acceptable options. In fact, type 1
men like their own type 2 woman best, and any type 2 woman from a neighboring node better
than their own type 1 woman (and analogously for type 2 women). Furthermore, through
our construction, type 1 men and type 2 women from neighboring nodes (vi, vj) ∈ E(G) are
connected in the social graph. Thus the “large matching” for agents corresponding to a node vi
and a node vj (i.e., {(mvi
1
, wvi
1
), (mvi
2
, wvi
2
), (m
vj
1
, w
vj
1
), (m
vj
2
, w
vj
2
)}) can not be simultaneously
supported by a socially stable matching.
We prove the following two lemmas for the above construction.
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Lemma 5.8 If G has an independent set S of size r then I has a socially stable matching M
of size n+ r.
Proof We take M = {(mvi
1
, wvi
2
) | vi ∈ V (G) \ S} ∪ {(mvi
1
, wvi
1
), (mvi
2
, wvi
2
) | vi ∈ S}. We
obviously have that |M | = n−|S|+2·|S| = n+r. The pairs (mvi
1
, wvi
2
) are always socially stable.
For the rest of the pairs, the independent set property guarantees that for every vj ∈ NG(S),
the matching of (m
vj
1
, w
vj
2
) keeps (mvi
1
, wvi
1
) and (mvi
2
, wvi
2
) socially stable. 
The reverse direction is a little more technical.
Lemma 5.9 If I has a socially stable matching of size n+ r then G has an independent set of
size r.
Proof First of all we can assume that M is such that all mvi
1
are matched. If there is an mvi
1
that is not matched we can just take wvi
2
and match her to him. If some other m
vj
1
gets single
by this action we just do it repeatedly until no such mvi
1
exists. This will not break social
stability of the matching nor decrease the size.
Claim 5.10 If there exists i 6= j such that (mvi
1
, w
vj
2
) ∈M , then (m
vj
1
, wvi
2
) ∈M as well.
Proof Notice first, that by our construction and the fact that (mvi
1
, w
vj
2
) ∈ M we get that
vj ∈ NG(vi). And hence (mvj
1
, wvi
2
) ∈ A(G′). Suppose now that the statement is not true and
take the minimum i such that (mvi
1
, w
vj
2
) ∈ M for some j 6= i. We first have that i < j. For
suppose that j < i, then if m
vj
1
is matched to some wvk
2
, for some k 6= j, that contradicts the
minimal choice of i. Hence it must be that m
vj
1
is matched to w
vj
1
. Since (m
vj
1
, wvi
2
) ∈ A(G′),
andm
vj
1
prefers wvi
2
over w
vj
1
, in order forM to be socially stable it must be that wvi
2
is matched
to someone that she prefers to m
vj
1
and that can only be some mvk
1
for some k < j < i, which
contradicts the minimal choice of i. So indeed, it must be that i < j.
Since (m
vj
1
, wvi
2
) /∈M and they are connected with an edge in G′, in order for M to be socially
stable it needs to be that at least one of m
vj
1
and wvi
2
gets a match underM that he/she prefers
to the other.
Suppose that wvi
2
is matched to some mvk
1
for some k < j (these are the only men that wvi
2
prefers to m
vj
1
, since her top choice, mvi
1
, is matched with someone else). Then (miv1 , w
k
v2) ∈
A(G′) by construction and so they can not block M . But mvi
1
prefers wvk
2
to w
vj
2
(since k < j),
and wvk
2
prefers mvi
1
to her current match unless her current match is a mvm
1
for some m 6= k
and m < i. But that would contradict the minimal selection of i. So it can’t be the case that
wvi
2
is matched under M to someone she prefers to m
vj
1
.
Suppose now that m
vj
1
is matched to some wvk
2
for some k < i. That would mean that mvk
1
is not matched to wvk
2
and if he is matched to some wvm
2
for some m 6= k, that would contradict
the minimal choice of i. Hence mvk
1
must be matched to wvk
1
. Since m
vj
1
is matched to wvk
2
and
k 6= j, by the way we constructed the preferences, that means that (vj , vk) ∈ E(G) and hence
(mvk
1
, w
vj
2
) ∈ A(G′). But that contradicts the social stability of M because w
vj
2
prefers mvk
1
to
mvi
2
(since k < i), mvk
1
prefers w
vj
2
to wvk
1
(since wvk
1
is his last choice). Hence, it can’t be the
case that m
vj
1
is matched under M to someone he prefers to wvi
2
.
So it needs to be that (m
vj
1
, wvi
2
) ∈M .
We can now take all dyads of pairs of the form {(mvi
1
, w
vj
2
), (m
vj
1
, wvi
2
)} for i 6= j that belong
to M and replace them with {(mvi
1
, wvi
2
), (m
vj
1
, w
vj
2
)}. This will not break social stability of M
nor decrease it’s size. We take now S = {vi | mvi
2
∈M}. Since all n of mvi
1
are matched in M
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there are r couples that contain some mvi
2
and hence |S| = |M | − n = r. S is an independent
set because mvi
2
can only be matched to wvi
2
and hence mvi
1
is matched to wvi
1
. The latter
pairs are only stable if for every vj ∈ NG(vi) it holds that mvj
1
is matched to w
vj
2
and hence
m
vj
2
/∈M which means that vj /∈ S and hence S is indeed an Independent Set. 
Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 combined give us a second proof of NP-hardness of MAX SMISS.
Austrin et al. in [5] show that assuming the unique games conjecture IND SET is hard to
approximate within a factor of O
(
d
log2 d
)
for Independent sets of size k =
(
1
2 −Θ
(
log(log d)
log d
))
n,
where n is the size of the vertex set and d is an upper bound on the degree. Combining that
result and Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 5.11 Assuming the UGC, MAX SMISS cannot be approximated within a 3/2 − ε,
for any constant ε > 0.
Proof The proof follows from the relationship between SMISS and IND SET shown by Lemmas
5.8 and 5.9 and the result from [5]. It’s exactly the same as the proof of Corollary 4 of [16].
We set d = δn for some constant δ > 0 and we get that finding the maximum socially stable
matching is hard to approximate within a factor of
n+
(
1
2 −Θ
(
log(logn)
logn
))
n
n+
(
1
2 −Θ
(
log(logn)
logn
))
n ·O
(
logn
n
) ≥ 3
2
− ε (1)
for sufficiently large n. 
6 Some special cases of HRSS
Given the hardness results obtained for the problem of finding a maximum socially stable
matching in a general HRSS instance, the need arises to investigate special cases of the problem
that are tractable. This section describes some polynomial-time solvability results for three
special cases of HRSS. Subsection 6.1 gives a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maximum
socially stable matching given an instance of (2,∞)-MAX SMISS. In Subsection 6.2 we provide
a polynomial-time algorithm for MAX HRSS in the case where there is a constant number
of unacquainted pairs and in Subsection 6.3 we also consider the case where the number of
acquainted pairs is constant, again providing a polynomial time-algorithm for MAX HRSS in
that context.
6.1 (2,∞)-MAX SMISS
Given an SMISS instance (I,G), where the men are allowed to have at most two women in
their preference lists and each woman is allowed to have an unbounded-length preference list,
we show that a maximum socially stable matching can be found in polynomial time. We make
slight modifications to the algorithm used to find a maximum stable matching in a (2,∞)-MAX
SMTI (the problem of finding a maximum stable matching given an SMTI instance where men
are allowed to have at most two women on their preference list) instance described in [20]. The
resulting algorithm, which we call (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg, is broken down into three phases.
In Phase 1, some pairs that cannot be involved in any socially stable matching in (I,G)
are deleted from the instance. A pair (mi, wj) is deleted by removing mi from wj ’s preference
list and vice versa. We call the resulting preference lists the reduced preference lists. For each
man mi, if the first woman wj on mi’s preference list satisfies (mi, wj) ∈ A, where A = E(G)
is the set of acquainted pairs in (I,G), we delete all pairs (mk, wj) for all successors mk of mi
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Algorithm 3 (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg
1: /* Phase 1 */
2: while some man mi has a first-choice woman wj such that (mi, wj) ∈ A do
3: for each successor mk of mi on wj ’s list do
4: delete the pair (mk, wj);
5: end for
6: end while
7: /* Phase 2 */
8: G′ := buildGraph();
9: MG′ := minimum weight maximum matching in G
′;
10: /* Phase 3 */
11: M :=MG′ ;
12: while there exists a man mi who is matched to his second-choice woman wk
and his first-choice wj is an unmatched woman such that (mi, wj) ∈ A do
13: M :=M\{(mi, wk)};
14: M :=M ∪ {(mi, wj)};
15: end while
16: return M ;
Algorithm 4 buildGraph
1: V := U ∪W ; /* U and W are sets of men and women in I */
2: E′ := ∅;
3: for each man mi ∈ U do
4: for each woman wj on mi’s reduced list do
5: E′ := E′ ∪ {(mi, wj)};
6: weight(mi, wj) := rank(wj ,mi);
7: end for
8: end for
9: G′ := (V,E′);
10: return G′;
on wj ’s preference list. (mk, wj) cannot be involved in any socially stable matching as (mi, wj)
will socially block any matching they were involved in.
In Phase 2, we construct a weighted bipartite graph G′ from the resulting instance with a
reduced preference list. This is done by representing the men and women as nodes on the two
sides of the graph and adding an edge between a man mi on one side and a woman wj on the
other if wj appears on mi’s preference list. The weight placed on the edge will be the position
of mi on wj’s preference list (denoted by rank(wj,mi)). Algorithm 4 describes the process. A
minimum cost maximum cardinality matching MG′ in the the resulting bipartite graph is then
generated using the algorithm described in [10].
At this stage it is not guaranteed that the resulting maximum matching MG′ is socially
stable. MG′ may admit a social blocking pair (mi, wj), where (mi, wj) ∈ A, wj is the first-
choice partner ofmi, mi is assigned to his second-choice partner wk inMG′ and wj is unassigned
inMG′ (as we will show later, this the only form of social blocking pair thatMG′ can admit). To
remove such blocking pairs, during Phase 3, we assign mi to wj thus making wk unmatched. At
this stage, wk may herself be the first-choice woman that forms a pair with some other man ml
in the resulting matching such that (ml, wk) ∈ A. The process continues until there is no man
who is matched to his second-choice woman while forming an edge in G with his unmatched
first-choice woman. Algorithm 3 shows the entire (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg algorithm.
We now show that at the end of this phase, for (2,∞)-MAX SMISS instances, the matching
produced is both socially stable and of maximum size.
Lemma 6.1 (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg terminates.
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Proof It is easy to see that Phases 1 and 2 terminate. For every iteration of Phase 3, one man
always improves from his second to his first choice while no man obtains a worst partner or
becomes unmatched. Since the total number of possible improvements is finite, it is clear the
phase is bound to terminate. 
Lemma 6.2 Phase 1 of (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg never deletes a socially stable pair, which is
a man-woman pair that belongs to some socially stable matching in (I,G).
Proof Suppose pair (mi, wj) is deleted during some execution of (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg and
(mi, wj) ∈ M where M is some socially stable matching in (I,G). Then mi was deleted from
wj’s preference list because wj was the first-choice woman of some manmk such that (mk, wj) ∈
A and wj prefers mk to mi. Therefore (mk, wj) will socially block M , a contradiction. 
Lemma 6.3 The matching returned by (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg is socially stable in (I,G).
Proof Suppose the matching M produced by (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg is not socially stable in
(I,G). Then some pair (mi, wj) ∈ A socially blocks M in I. For this to occur, one of the
following cases must arise.
Case (i): mi and wj are unmatched in M . Then mi is unmatched in MG′ and either
wj was initially unmatched in MG′ or became unmatched due to some operation in Phase
3 of (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-alg. If wj was initially unmatched in MG′ then MG′ could have
been increased in size by adding (mi, wj) thus contradicting the fact that MG′ is of maximum
cardinality. Suppose wj became unmatched due to Phase 3. Let mp1 denote wj ’s partner in
MG′ . During Phase 3, mp1 must have become assigned to his first-choice woman wq1 . Suppose
wq1 was unmatched in MG′ . Then a larger matching can be obtained by augmenting MG′
along the path (mi, wj), (wj ,mp1), (mp1 , wq1) contradicting to the fact that MG is of maximum
cardinality. Thus wq1 must have been assigned in MG′ and became unmatched during Phase 3
as well. If wq1 was assigned to mp2 in MG′ , mp2 must have become assigned to his first-choice
woman wq2 during Phase 3. Using a similar argument to that used for wq1 , we can argue
that wq2 must have been assigned in MG′ as well. Thus some man moved from wq2 to his
first-choice woman. This process may be continued and at each iteration of Phase 3, some
man must strictly improve and no man becomes worse off. Since the possible number of such
improvements is finite, there are a finite number of women that can be unmatched in this way
in Phase 3. Hence at some point, there exists a man mps , who switches to his first-choice
woman wqs and wqs was already unmatched in MG′ . We can then construct an augmenting
path in G′ of the form (mi, wj), (wj ,mp1), (mp1 , wq1), (wq1 ,mp2), (mp2 , wq2), ..., (mps , wqs) which
contradicts the fact that MG′ is of maximum cardinality.
Case (ii): mi is unmatched in M and wj prefers mi to ml =M(wj). Then mi is unmatched
in MG′ as well. Suppose that wj was assigned to ml in MG′ . Since wj prefers mi to ml, a
matching of equal size to MG′ but with a lower weight can be obtained by pairing mi with wj ,
leaving ml unmatched, thus contradicting the fact that MG′ is a minimum weight maximum
cardinality matching. Thus wj is not assigned to ml in MG′ . Then wj is either unmatched
in MG′ or is assigned in MG′ to some man mp, where mp 6= ml and mp 6= mi. If wj is
unmatched in MG′ , the fact that MG′ is a maximum cardinality matching is contradicted. If
wj is assigned to mp in MG′ then since wj is no longer assigned to mp in M , mp must have
switched to his first-choice woman wq during Phase 3. Hence either wq was unmatched in MG′
or wq became unmatched due to some man being switched to his first-choice woman. Using a
similar argument as in case (i), we can construct an augmenting path that contradicts the fact
that MG′ is of maximum cardinality.
Case (iii): mi is assigned to wk in M and mi prefers wj to wk and wj is unmatched in M .
Since mi’s preference list is of length 2, wj is mi’s first-choice and (mi, wj) ∈ A and so this case
satisfies the loop condition in Phase 3 and thus should never arise once Phase 3 has terminated
(as it must, by Lemma 6.1).
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Case (iv): mi is assigned to wk in M and mi prefers wj to wk and wj is assigned to ml in
M and wj prefers mi to ml. Once again, since mi’s list is of length 2, then wj must be mi’s
first-choice and (mi, wj) ∈ A. Therefore the loop condition of Phase 1 would have ensured that
man ml was deleted from wj’s preference list. 
Since, by Lemma 6.2, Phase 1 never deletes a socially stable pair, a maximum socially sta-
ble matching must consist of pairs that belong to the reduced lists. Since MG′ is a maximum
matching and Phase 3 never reduces the size of the matching, it follows that the matching
produced by the algorithm is of maximum cardinality. Finally since by Lemma 6.3, the match-
ing produced is a socially stable matching, it follows that the algorithm produces a maximum
socially stable matching in (I,G).
The complexity of the algorithm is dominated by Phase 2. The complexity of the algorithm
for finding the minimum cost maximum matching in G′ = (V,E′) is O(
√|V ||E′| log |V |) [10].
Let n = |V | = n1 + n2 be the total number of men and women. Since the set A of acceptable
pairs satisfies |A| ≤ 2n1 = O(n), it follows that (2,∞)-MAX SMISS has a time complexity of
O(n3/2 log n). We have thus proved the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4 Given an instance (I,G) of (2,∞)-MAX SMISS, Algorithm (2,∞)-MAX-SMISS-
alg generates a maximum socially stable matching in O(n3/2 log n) time, where n is the total
number of residents and hospitals in (I,G).
6.2 HRSS with a constant number of unacquainted pairs
It is easy to see that in the special case where the set U of unacquainted pairs is exactly the set
A of acceptable pairs in the underlying HR instance, then the set A of acquainted pairs satisfies
A = ∅ and every matching found is a socially stable matching. Also if the instance contains no
unacquainted pairs (i.e., A = A and U = ∅), then only stable matchings in the classical sense
are socially stable. In both these cases, a maximum socially stable matching can be generated
in polynomial time. The case may however arise where the number of unacquainted pairs is
constant. In this case, we show that it is also possible to generate a maximum socially stable
matching in polynomial time.
Let (I,G) be an instance of HRSS and let S ⊆ A be a subset of the acceptable pairs in
I. We denote I\S as the instance of HR obtained from I by deleting the pairs in S from the
preference lists in I. The following proposition plays a key role in establishing the correctness
of the algorithm.
Proposition 6.5 Let (I,G) be an instance of HRSS. Let M be a socially stable matching in
(I,G). Then there exists a set of unacquainted pairs U ′ ⊆ U such that M is stable in I ′ = I\U ′.
Conversely suppose that M is a stable matching in I ′ = I\U ′ for some U ′ ⊆ U . Then M is
socially stable in (I,G).
Proof Suppose M is socially stable in (I,G). Let U ′ = U\(M ∩ U) = U\M . We claim that
M is stable in I ′ = I\U ′. Suppose (ri, hj) blocks M in I ′. Then (ri, hj) /∈ M and edges in I ′
are those in A ∪M ∩ U and (ri, hj) /∈ M ∩ U . Thus (ri, hj) ∈ A making M socially unstable
in (I,G), a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that M is stable in I ′ = I\U ′ for some U ′ ⊆ U . We claim that M is
socially stable in (I,G). Suppose that (ri, hj) socially blocks M in (I,G), then (ri, hj) ∈ A so
(ri, hj) /∈ U . Thus (ri, hj) is a pair in I ′ and so (ri, hj) blocks M in I ′, a contradiction. 
By considering all subsets U ′ ⊆ U , forming I ′, finding a stable matching in each such I ′
and keeping a record of the maximum stable matching found, we obtain a maximum socially
stable matching in (I,G). This discussion leads to the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.6 Given an instance (I,G) of HRSS where the set U of unacquainted pairs is
of constant size, a maximum socially stable matching can be generated in O(m) time, where
m = |A| is the number of acceptable pairs.
Proof By considering all subsets U ′ ⊆ U , forming I ′, finding stable a matching in each such I ′
and keeping a record of the maximum stable matching found, we obtain a maximum socially
stable matching in (I,G). Let M be the largest stable matching found over all I ′ = I\U ′ where
U ′ ⊆ U . Then by Proposition 6.5, M is socially stable in (I,G). Suppose for a contradiction
that M ′ is a socially stable matching in I where |M ′| > |M |. Then by Proposition 6.5 there
exists some U ′′ ⊆ U such that M ′ is stable in I ′′. But that contradicts M as the largest stable
matching in I\U ′ taken over all U ′ ⊆ U .
Finding all subsets of U can be done in O(2k) time where k = |U |. Forming I ′ and finding
a stable matching in I ′ can be done in O(|A|) time where A is the set of acceptable pairs in
I. Hence the overall time complexity of the algorithm is O(2k|A|) which is polynomial with
respect to the instance size as k is a constant. 
6.3 HRSS with a constant number of acquainted pairs
We now consider the restriction of HRSS in which the set A of acquainted pairs is of constant
size k. Given an instance (I,G) of this problem we show that a maximum socially stable
matching can be found in polynomial time. Let A = {e1, e2, ..., ek} where ei represents an
acquainted pair (rsi , hti) (1 ≤ i ≤ k). A tree T of depth k is constructed with all nodes
at depth i labelled ei+1 (i ≥ 0). There are left and right branches below ei. Each branch
corresponds to a condition placed on rsi or hti with respect to a matching M . The left branch
below ei (i.e., a resident condition branch) corresponds to the condition that rsi is matched in
M and prefers his partner to hti . The right branch below ei (i.e., a hospital condition branch)
corresponds to the condition that hti is fully subscribed in M and has a partner no worse than
rsi . Satisfying at least one of these conditions ensures thatM admits no blocking pair involving
(rsi , hti). The tree is constructed in this manner with the nodes at depth k − 1, labelled ek,
branching in the same way to dummy leaf nodes ek+1 (not representing acquainted pairs).
A path P from the root node e1 to a leaf node ek+1 will visit all pairs in A exactly once.
Every left branch in P gives a resident condition and every right branch gives a hospital
condition. Let R′ and H ′ be the set of residents and hospitals involved in resident and hospital
conditions in P respectively. Given a matching M , enforcing all the conditions along P can
be achieved by first deleting all pairs from the instance I that could potentially violate these
conditions. So if some resident condition along P states that a resident rsi must be matched
in M to a hospital he prefers to hti then rsi ’s preference list is truncated starting with hti . If
some hospital condition states that a hospital hti must be fully subscribed in M and must not
be matched to a resident worse than rsi then hti ’s preference list is truncated starting from the
resident immediately following rsi . After performing these truncations based on the conditions
along P , a new HR instance I ′ is obtained.
Proposition 6.7 If M is a matching in I ′ that is computed at the leaf node of a path P and
all residents in R′ are matched in M and all hospitals in H ′ are fully subscribed in M then M
is a socially stable matching in (I,G).
Proof Suppose some resident-hospital pair socially blocks M in (I,G). Then this pair belongs
to A so it corresponds to a node ei = (rsi , hti) in T for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ k). So in M , either
(i) rsi is unmatched or prefers hti to M(rsi) and (ii) either hti is undersubscribed or prefers
rsi to M(hti). Suppose in T , the left hand branch from ei was chosen when following a path
P from the root to a leaf node. Then rsi ∈ R′, rsi is matched and by the truncations carried
out, rsi has a better partner than hti , a contradiction. Thus the right hand branch from ei
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was chosen when following P . Then hti ∈ H ′, hti is fully subscribed and by the truncations
hti has no partner worse than rsi . But (rsi , hti) /∈ M , so hti has a partner better than rsi , a
contradiction. 
With I ′ obtained due the truncations carried out by satisfying conditions along a path P
from the root node to a leaf node, we then seek to obtain a matching in which all the residents
in R′ are matched and hospitals in H ′ are fully subscribed. For each hospital hj in I
′, we define
a set of clones of hj , {hj,1, hj,2, ..., hj,cj}, corresponding to the number of posts cj available in
hj . Let H
′′ = {hj,k : hj ∈ H ′ ∧ 1 ≤ k ≤ cj} denote the set of all clones obtained from hospitals
in H ′. We define a bipartite graph G′ where one set of nodes is represented by the set of
residents in I ′ and the other set of nodes is represented by the hospital clones in I ′. If ri finds
hj acceptable in I, we add an edge from ri to hj,q in G
′ for all q (1 ≤ q ≤ cj). We define a new
graph G′′ containing the same nodes and edges in G′ with weights placed on the edges. We
mark all the nodes representing the residents in R′ and the hospital clones in H ′′ as red nodes
with the remaining nodes uncoloured. We place weights on the edges as follows: (i) an edge
between a red node and an uncoloured node is given a weight of 1; (ii) an edge between two
red nodes is given weight of 2; (iii) an edge between two uncoloured nodes is given a weight of
0. We then find a maximum weight matching M ′ in the resulting weighted bipartite graph G′′.
Let wt(M ′) denote the weight of a matching M ′ in G′′. Then
wt(M ′) = |{(ri, hj,q) ∈M ′ : ri ∈ R′}|+ |{(ri, hj,q) ∈M ′ : hj,q ∈ H ′′}| ≤ |R′|+ |H ′′|.
Moreover wt(M ′) = |R′| + |H ′′| if and only if every agent in R′ ∪ H ′′ is matched in M ′.
For such a matching M ′ in G′′, by construction, M ′ is also a matching in G′ and a maximum
cardinality matching M ′′ can be obtained in G′ by continuously augmenting M ′ until no aug-
menting path can be found. Since any node already matched in M ′ will remain matched inM ′′
it follows that all the residents and hospital clones in R′∪H ′′ will be matched inM ′′ and such a
matching, by Proposition 6.7, will be socially stable in (I,G). If however, wt(M ′) < |R′|+ |H ′′|
then some resident or hospital clone in R′∪H ′′ remains unmatched in any maximum matching
in G′ introducing the possibility of a social blocking pair of M ′ in (I,G). In this case, P is
ruled as infeasible and another path is considered, otherwise P is called feasible.
There are 2k paths from the root node to leaf nodes in the tree T . The following proposition
is important to our result.
Proposition 6.8 There must exist at least one feasible path in T .
Proof Let M be a stable matching in I. Then M is socially stable in (I,G). Consider each
node ei = (rsi , hti) in T . If (rsi , hti) ∈ M , we branch right at ei. If (rsi , hti) /∈ M , and rsi is
matched and has a partner better than hti , we branch left at ei. If (rsi , hti) /∈ M , and hti is
fully subscribed and has no partner worse than rsi , we branch right at ei. Any other condition
would mean that (rsi , hti) would block M in I, a contradiction. This process, starting from
the root node e1, gives a feasible path P through T to some leaf node v where, for the set of
residents R′ and hospitals H ′ involved in P , wt(M) = |R′|+ |H ′|. 
To generate a maximum socially stable matching M in an instance (I,G) of HRSS, all
2k paths through T from the root node to leaf nodes are considered with a record kept of the
maximum matchingM ′′ computed at the leaf node of each feasible path. The desired matching
M can then be constructed by letting
M = {(ri, hj) : (ri, hj,k) ∈M ′′ for some k (1 ≤ k ≤ cj)}.
Proposition 6.9 If M is a matching obtained from the process described above, M is a max-
imum socially stable matching in (I, G).
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Proof Proposition 6.7 shows that M is socially stable in (I,G). Suppose M ′ is a socially
stable matching in (I,G) such that |M ′| > |M |. Construct a feasible path P through T from
the root node to a leaf node v, branching left or right at each node ei = (rsi , hti) as follows. If
rsi is matched in M
′ to some hospital better than hti , branch left. Otherwise as (rsi , hti) is not
a social blocking pair of M ′, hti is fully subscribed in M
′ with no assignee worse than rsi , in
which case branch right. As before, construct sets R′ and H ′ as follows. For every left branch
in P involving a resident rsi , add rsi to R
′ and for every right branch in P involving a hospital
hti , add hti to H
′. Matching M ′ then satisfies the property that every resident rsi ∈ R′ is
matched inM ′ to a hospital better than hti and every hospital hti ∈ H ′ is fully subscribed with
residents no worse than rsi . At the leaf node v of P , the algorithm constructs a matching M
′′
which is of maximum cardinality with respect to the restrictions that every resident rsi ∈ R′
is matched to a hospital better than hti and every hospital hti ∈ H ′ is fully subscribed with
residents no worse than rsi . Hence |M ′′| ≥ |M ′| and since |M ′| > |M |, it follows that M ′′
contradicts the choice of M as the largest matching taken over all leaf nodes. 
The above proposition leads to the following main result of this subsection.
Theorem 6.10 Given an instance (I,G) of HRSS where the set A of acquainted pairs sat-
isfies |A| = k for some constant k, a maximum socially stable matching can be generated in
O(cmaxm
√
n1 + C) time where n1 is the number of residents, m is the number of acceptable
pairs, cmax is the largest capacity of any hospital and C is the total capacity of all the hospitals
in the problem instance.
Proof Since |A| = k is constant, the number of leaf nodes (and subsequently the number of
paths from the root node to a leaf node) is also constant (2k). Performing the truncations
imposed by the conditions along a path can be done in O(m) time where m is the number of
acceptable pairs in I. The number of nodes n′ and the number of edges m′ in G′ are given by:
m′ =
n2∑
j=1
|pref(hj)|cj ≤ cmax
n2∑
j=1
|pref(hj)| ≤ cmaxm
n′ = n1 +
n2∑
j=1
cj = n1 + C
where n1 is the number of residents, n2 is the number of hospitals, pref(hj) is the set of
residents in hj ’s preference list, cmax is the largest capacity of any hospital and C is the total
number of posts in the problem instance. Finding a maximum weight matching in G′′ can
be done in O(m′
√
n′) time [9] (since the edge weights have O(1) size). Augmenting such a
matching to a maximum cardinality matching in G′ can be done in O(m′
√
n′) time [17]. Thus
the time complexity of the algorithm is O(cmaxm
√
n1 + C). 
Following the results in Theorems 6.6 and 6.10, we conclude this section with the theorem
below showing the existence of FPT algorithms for MAX HRSS under two different parame-
terisations.
Theorem 6.11 MAX HRSS is in FPT with parameter k, where either k = |A| or k = |U |,
and A and U are the sets of acquainted and unacquainted pairs respectively.
7 Open problems
The study of the Hospitals / Residents problem under Social Stability is still at an early stage,
and some interesting open problems remain. Firstly it is worth investigating the complexity
of finding socially stable matchings with additional optimality properties (such as egalitarian
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/ minimum regret socially stable matchings [19, 12]). It may also be interesting to determine
whether the set of socially stable matchings in an HRSS instance admits any structure similar
to that present in the case of stable matchings in HR. Also extending the algorithm for (2,∞)-
MAX SMISS to the HRSS case remains open. The HRSS model described in this paper does
not consider the scenario where ties exist in the preference lists of agents. It remains open to
investigate this variant of the problem.
We close by remarking that currently in the HRSS context, if (r, h) is a blocking pair of a
matching M where h is undersubscribed and (r, h) ∈ U , then (r, h) is not a social blocking pair
of M . However it could be argued that information about undersubscribed hospitals would be
in the public domain, and hence the social blocking pair definition should not require that r
and h have a social tie in this case. It would be interesting to investigate algorithmic aspects
of this variant of HRSS.
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